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Introduction: from Stalin to Khrushchev
The peasantry . . pays a certain supertax in the
form of an over-payment for manufactured goods,
and in the form of an under-payment received for
agricultural produce . .. Can we abolish this
supertax at the first opportunity, in the next few
years . . . Unfortunately we cannot. We must
abolish it at the first opportunity, in the next few
years. . . Are we right in calling this additional tax
'something in the nature of a tribute'? Unquestion-
ably we are. By our choice of words we are pointing
out to our comrades that this additional tax is
detestable and undesirable, and that its continuance
for any considerable period is impermissible.
[Stalin 1955:52-4]
Thus Stalin in 1929. When he died a quarter of a
century later, the 'tribute' was still being paid.
Ironically, contemporary research indicates that the
agricultural sector may have made little net
contribution to the industrialisation drive in the 1930s
[ElIman 1979:92-6]. Such was the destruction of
agricultural capital stock, especially livestock, resulting
from the harsh imposition of collectivisation on a
largely unwilling peasantry that significant counter-
flows of resources had to be set up to keep agriculture
moving at all. What collectivisation did ensure was
that there was always a gross flow of food products
into the towns adequate to feed the growing urban
population. It may also, by destroying the family-
based peasant farm, have facilitated the shift of
population into the towns (between 1926 and 1939
43.4 million people migrated from rural to urban
localities [Gregory and Stuart 1981:243] though the
history of Yugoslavia, for example, suggests that the
attraction of rapid industrialisation may be all that is
required to generate a population transfer on this
scale. Finally, the imposition of direct control over
agriculture permitted the Soviet Government to earn
precious foreign exchange by increasing agricultural
exports. In 1931 18 per cent of wheat production was
exported [Gregory and Stuart 1981:243]. By 1932 the
Soviet countryside was in the grip of a famine that cost
the lives of millions of peasants.
The immediate cause of [the famine] was not poor
harvests but the requisitioning of grain from
moderate harvests in such quantities that not
enough was left for the peasants themselves. The
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main reasons for this drastic policy appear to have
been, first, the attempt to maintain exports of
agriculture produce and hence imports of
machinery . . . [Hanson 1968:36]
This may, incidentally, have helped to convince Stalin
of the need to allow peasants to farm small private
plots which subsequently developed a crucial role, in
terms not only of subsistence, but also of supply to the
non-farm population of key food items such as eggs.
In 1953 45.7 per cent of aggregate collective farm
family income came from the private plots [Ostrovskii
1967:93].
Perhaps the most important 'objective' reason why
exaction of the tribute went on so long was the
intervention of a disastrous, if ultimately victorious
war, which left much of the industrial potential of
European Russia in ruins. There is a much better basis
for arguing a net transfer of resources from agriculture
to industry in relation to the late 1940s and early 1950s
than for the 1930s, and this may have been a
significant factor in the impressive industrial recovery
that the Soviet Union made in 1945-55. But in 1954
agricultural output was actually lower than it had been
in 1928, and with an ever increasing urban population
to feed the policy of putting the priority on
procurements rather than production had come to the
end of the road.
This was the problem that Khrushchev, who by 1956
had established himself as Stalin's successor, tried to
tackle. Khrushchev raised procurement prices sharply,
and this permitted peasant incomes to more than
double between 1953, the year of Stalin's death, and
1967 [Gregory and Stuart 1981:239]. Just as
important, it permitted an upward shift in the flow of
investment into the farm sector. (The great bulk of
collective farm investment has to be financed by the
farm itself.) In 1950 agriculture accounted for 15 per
cent of total Soviet gross investment. By 1965 this had
risen to 16.7 per cent, though the weight of the sector
by output and employment had fallen considerably
over that period [Dyker, forthcoming, Chapter 7,
Table 7.3]. Better incentives and increased investment
facilitated an increase of some 70 per cent in
agricultural output from 1954 to 1965 [Gregory and
Stuart 1981:249]. But Khrushchev devoted much
effort and many resources to various 'campaigns' of
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questionable value. Some, like the maize campaign,
were, in the words of his political successors,
completely 'harebrained'. Others, like the massive
extension of sown area into the semi-arid 'virgin
lands', produced impressive short-term results at the
cost of long-term environmental damage, as erosion
set in. It is perhaps not difficult to see why Khrushchev
felt impelled to seek some immediate panacea for a
problem at once pressing and embarrassing. But by
the early l960s the long term cost of these adventures
were once again pulling down agricultural growth
rates. Output from the 'virgin lands' for example,
peaked in 1960 and then fell to less than half the 1960
level in the period up to 1963 [Dyker 1976:130].
Developments since 1965 -
the Main Features
The secular policy thrust of the Brezhnev leadership
has been essentially a continuation of the Khrushchev
approach. Further improvements in agricultural
prices permitted the average income of collective
farmers from work on the collective farm (kolkhoz)
alone to approach 60 per cent of the average for non-
agricultural workers by 1975, with state farm
(sdvkhoz) income very nearly at the level of non-farm
workers by that year [Schroeder and Severin
1976:629]. Taking the private sector into account, the
gap between farm and non-farm incomes in the Soviet
Union is certainly now no greater than it is in many
western countries. Investment inputs into agriculture
have also risen steadily throughout the post-1965
period, and agricultural investment as a proportion of
total investment was around 20 per cent throughout
the 1970s [UN 1977 Part 2:100; 1982:Table 3.2.4.]. The
Brezhnev leadership has been less prone to get
involved in grand schemes, but the ambitious
programme for land improvement in the 'non-Black
Earth' ie northern region of European Russia, which
started in 1974, has been not a little reminiscent of
Khrushchevian campaignology. And whatever the
precise direction of causation, output and productivity
trends over the Brezhnev era have been very similar to
those under Khrushchev - an initial sustained spurt,
followed by slow-down or stagnation. As Table I
shows, Soviet agricultural production was actually
lower in 1981 than it had been in 1973. Average annual
output of grain showed a modest increase from
181.55 tons in 1971-75 to 205.05 tons in 1976-80 [UN
1982 Table 3.2.7.].
It is evident, then, that Soviet agriculture faces
enormous problems. In what follows I will in the main
be discussing only one group of problems - those
relating to organisation and incentives. Agricultural
conditions in the Soviet Union are very difficult, and
much of the cultivable area is naturally infertile or
prone to drought. All of it, outside Central Asia and
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Table ¡
Rates of growth of Soviet agricultural output and
productivity
(based on figures in value terms)
Sources: official Soviet and UN statistics
the Caucasus, lies very far north by West European or
North American standards. Consideration of com-
parative advantage might suggest that the Soviet
agricultural sector should be sharply reduced in size,
and/or radically redirected in terms of the balance of
sub-sectors. But the Soviet state has been concerned to
maintain a maximum degree of self-sufficiency in
foodstuffs, and I do not intend to question this very
general strategic orientation. There seems to be broad
agreement among Western and Soviet specialists that
there is enormous room for improvement in
organisation and incentives, whatever other problems
exist. There may be less agreement on exactly how best
to bring about such an improvement, but relations
between the central authorities and the kolkhoz or
sovkhoz, and those between the farm and its sub-
divisions and the farm and the private sector, have
been a recurring focus of attention.
The socialist farm
Kolkhozy have formally always been autonomous
cooperatives. Chairmen are formally elected, though
in practice always nominated by higher Party or state
authorities. Sovkhozy, prior to 1967, were budget
financed state enterprises. Now they operate on
khozraschot - 'business accounting' - ie they use
standard profit-and-loss accounting procedures, and
have formally constituted incentive funds,just like any
state industrial enterprise. State farms are managed by
















edinonachalie - 'one-man-management'. In fact all
farms were traditionally subject to a peculiar degree of
arbitrary interference from above. Not only did the
authorities impose on them obligatory procurement
targets, which was in accordance with the planning
law of the land, they also tended to tell them how these
targets should be achieved, which was strictly illegal.
Thus Communist Party 'plenipotentiaries' would
descend on a farm, organising campaigns, setting
extra targets, often on the basis of little knowledge of
local conditions and problems. This was one respect in
which the Khrushchev period differed little from the
Stalin period, but the 1965 change in government did,
at least initially, produce a strong reaction against the
tradition. In 1968, a semi-official source declared that
'the plenipotentiary has been abolished' [Yagodin
1968:26]. The number of products carrying a
compulsory procurement target for each farm has
been reduced, permitting farm managements to take a
more positive policy line on specialisation [Gray
1979:546], and the centre has not in recent times
sought to determine farm investment patterns
systematically [Gregory and Stuart 1981:236]. Cer-
tainly the big land improvement schemes of the post-
1947 period have inevitably interfered in farm
operations, and even the movement towards more
specialisation has tended to take on the characteristics
of an old-style campaign [Gray 1979:546]. But there
has been some development in centre-farm relations.
The fact that it has failed to make much impression on
output trends suggests that the really important
organisational variables lie elsewhere.
. . .
The counterpoint to all this provided by trends in
policy on farm organisation and the private subsidiary
sector has been a complex one. As a general rule the
authorities have relaxed their attitude on decentrali-
sation at the grass-roots level when things have been
very bad, and tightened up when they improved again.
Thus the Brezhnev leadership was initially favourably
inclined towards intra-farm decentralisation, as they
tried to regain the momentum of the early Khrushchev
period, but reversed their policy stance in the early
1970s. Now the boot may once again be on the other
foot, and private subsidiary agriculture is also
currently being much encouraged. Perhaps the best
way to evoke this pattern is to look at the history of
autonomous organisation within the farm.
The 'link' system
The principle form of organisation within the kolkhoz
and sovkhoz has, throughout the history of post-
collectivisation agriculture, been the brigade. A
traditional brigade is a largish unit, up to 100 strong,
performing general agricultural tasks, and epitomising
the extensive utilisation of unskilled labour. The
alternative link (zveno), by contrast, is a small unit,
often of less than ten people, which is allocated a
particular piece of land to work, or a particular
specialised function. The link was in favour with Stalin
himself in the late 1940s, but fell sharply into disfavour
in 1950. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Khrushchev
made the link the subject of one of his campaigns
- without great success, perhaps because he put the
emphasis on the 'crop-attached' link, which has to
move from one piece of land to the next with the crop
rotation [Pospielovsky 1970:425-6]. The autonomous,
or 'normless' link, which came to the forefront in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, is simply given a small piece
of land, (hopefully) the necessary equipment, and left
to get on with it. No set tasks as such are handed down,
only a sales plan, and members share in the profits of
overplan sales {Kolesnevov 197 1:23]. The emphasis in
this period on the 'land-attached' link represented a
clear recognition of the tremendous psychological
importance of giving, or rather returning, some real
sense of 'mastery' of the land to the peasants [Kopysov
1968:10].
Yet in 1971 I. Khudenko, architect of the highly
successful Achki integrated link system, one of the
most advanced decentralised forms, was imprisoned
on trumped-up charges. He later died in jail
[Katsenelinboigen 1978:66]. This by no means spelt
the end of the link, or of experiments in
decentralisation, but it did represent a reassertion of
the power of the Communist Party apparatus men
- the rural district Party secretaries etc. They clearly
felt that autonomisation was going too far, and they
were also worried about the fact that many normless
links were in fact being operated by family groups
[Ivanov 1968:10]. There was a simultaneous crack-
down on the semi-independent operations of rural
subsidiary industrial plants, [Dyker 1981:140-2] and it
can hardly have been accidental that soon after the
'campaign' approach started to creep back into
agricultural policy. For the time being at least, it was
going to be the Party and state authorities, not the
farms, that decided on patterns of decentralisation.
While links continued to operate on many farms, the
late l970s witnessed a shift in emphasis towards the
autonomous brigade. Under this system the brigade
council administers, and can modify, the system of
incentive payments to members, with direct farm-
peasant relationships being reduced to a minimum
[Bakhtaryshev 1980:19]. Under full brigade khozraschot
(see above), the primary production unit operates, in
principle at least, as a quasi-independent mini-
enterprise, with sales, wage-fund and material cost the
only planned indicators coming down from farm level
[Revenok and Pichugin 1981:19]. The autonomous
link, of course, normally does not even have wage-
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fund and cost plans, and the size of the brigade must in
any case mean less effective autonomy for the
individual peasant than under the link system.
But the trend back to more bureaucracy and more
interference over the last ten years has tended to
neutralise all these developments. Even where the link
system survives and works quite well, for example in
large-scale dairy units, it suffers, we are told by a
Pravda correspondent, from being over-bureaucratised
and too complex, which suggests little effective
autonomy for the link. But this writer's answer to the
problem is more, not less state and Party interference!
[Aksenov 1980:2]. Farm incentive schemes in general
are criticised for being so complex and confused that
actual payments have in many cases to be made on the
basis of 'common sense'. More seriously, the
continued prevalence, among planners and within
kolkhozy and sovkhozy, of 'ratchet planning' - setting
a given year's production or procurement target as a
standard percentage mark-up on the previous year's
actual production - means that agricultural workers
still have a strong incentive to hold back production
levels so that next year's plan will not be too
demanding. There have indeed, been cases where
implementation of the ratchet principle has actually
reduced peasants' wages as productivity has risen
[Aliev 1980:2]. Clearly no matter how decentralised
the particular link or brigade system, positive
incentive effects must be damaged if good performance
in a given year is effectively penalised in this way. The
November 1980 decree on agricultural planning
confirms the principle of setting targets on the basis of
average actual production levels over a five-year
period. Whether agricultural planners, faced with
disappointing aggregate results and under pressure
from their superiors to 'seek out reserves' among the
stronger units, will be able to stick to this self-denying
ordinance remains to be seen. Recent reports of
payments systems in use in farms using specialised
brigades speak of three-year rather than five-year
norms, and special rules to stop earnings shooting
ahead of productivity [Bogomolov 1982:14].
But whatever general problems exist, the last year or
two has once again seen a greater preparedness, at
least in some areas, to permit farms to organise their
own decentralised systems. In Azerbaidzhan, in the
Caucasus, for example, tobacco- and tea-growing,
viticulture and potato farming are being increasingly
organised on the basis of individual land-attachment.
Manuring, irrigation, application of pesticides etc is
done on a brigade or farm basis. So-called
gektarshchiki - 'hectarers' - are then allotted a
hectare and left to organise tending of the crops on a
personal basis, perhaps with some help from the
family but with no interference from above, except on
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winch crop is to be grown. There appear to be no
formal norms as such. Gektarshchiki are simply paid a
uniform price per kilogram. however much they turn
in, and annual earnings of as much as 3,500 rubles are
reported - at least double the average agricultural
wage. But by no means everyone is happy with the
gektarshchik system. The Azerbaidzhan Agricultural
Research Institute, for example, sees it as excessively
individualistic, and a hindrance to mechanisation
[Agaev 1981:10]. Once again, however, a deepening
general crisis in Soviet agriculture seems to be leading
to greater policy flexibility on the organisation of the
farm. Interestingly enough, subsidiary industrial
activity - building, building materials and food-
processing activities autonomously organised by
farms - also seems now to be creeping back into
favour [Mikheev 1982:16].
The private sector
The policy of the Brezhnev leadership towards the
private sector of agriculture has been more stable than
it was under Khrushchev. Here too, however, there
has been a new emphasis on the importance of the
sector in recent years, with guidelines being laid down
by the July 1978 Plenum of the Central Committee of
the CPSU. We can perhaps perceive two main thrusts
in the approach to private subsidiary agriculture
adopted since the late 1970s. On the one hand, the
private sector should, where possible, be integrated
into the operations of the socialist sector. On the other
hand, where unbridled free enterprise seems the best
way, it should be allowed to flourish.
The most straightforward 'deals' that state and
collective farms can do with their peasants in their
private capacity involves farming out livestock - pigs
and cattle - to the peasants to fatten on their plots. In
return for guaranteed supplies of fodder at reduced
prices the peasants deliver a proportion of the
resultant fatstock to the farm. A problem in the past
has been that the peasants have not been allowed to
sell their 'share' directly to the farm, but have had to
take it to the local agriculture procurement centre. As
well as inhibiting the development of cooperation this
has let in speculators who go around farms offering
high prices [Gomanov 1981:3]. But in Georgia a
system has been in operation since 1977 whereby
cooperating peasants can sell their private produce
directly to the farm, though in this case peasants do
undertake formal plans for sales to the farm IVeselov
1979:19]. In Abasha, in Georgia, collective farmers are
allowed to keep 10 per cent of the maize harvest on
plan fulfilment, and 70 per cent of overplan
production. In addition the collective farms are
(strictly illegally) giving kolkhozniki an extra hectare
of land for private cultivation of maize - on the basis
that they keep 70 per cent and give the farm 30 per cent
of the output, and also agree to sell to the state 200 kg
of meat per annum [Radio Svoboda 1982:21. Positive
reports on this kind of arrangement usually seem to
come from the South. In the northern non-Black
Earth region problems with fodder supply, and the
unwillingness of the younger generation of rural
inhabitants to get involved in time-consuming - if
idyllic - operations like hay-making, have been
among the reasons why the number of livestock in the
private sector has fallen sharply in recent years
[Sokolov 1982:19]. But there is clearly a desire to try to
do something about this.
Where the authorities appear currently to be more
prepared simply to give private activity its head is in
agriculture outside the state and collective farms. An
important part of this is the allotment sector. Town
dwellers are now being encouraged to work small plots
of 0.05-0.1 of a hectare, and permitted to sell their
surplus production without any interference whatso-
ever - ten years ago this sort of thing would get you
branded as a parasite and speculator [Rumer 1981].
Even Donbass coal-miners are being encouraged to
keep pigs [Monogarov 1980:3]. On a slightly grander
scale, enterprises are increasingly developing sub-
sidiary agricultural production on a socialist basis,
especially where waste heat etc can be utilised [Rumer
1981]. The Ministry for Light Industry is even issuing
formal plan targets for such developments [Rumer
1981:568].
Yet none of this appears to have done anything
significant to counteract the negative aggregate trends
in Soviet agriculture. Given the unsettled character of
government policy, this is perhaps not altogether
surprising. Lack of clear long-term prospects must
induce quick profit-taking in the private sector and a
degree of indifference in the socialist sector. There
have, however, been more material problems.
The problem of supply
The figures cited earlier on aggregate investment in
Soviet agriculture are in some ways rather misleading.
Much of the money is spent on dubious and/or poorly
implemented land improvement schemes. Irrigation
projects have frequently resulted in flooding problems
and secondary soil salination [Kalmykov and
Filipenko 1966]. Supply of key items to farms, on the
other hand, has often been unsatisfactory, and this has
particularly affected the private plots and links etc.
Small mowing machines suitable for cutting hay on
wooded and uneven land are not available to the
private sector, and neither are mini-tractors, though
they were promised a long time ago [Sokolov 1982].
Similar problems have affected the work of the
hectarers [Agaev 1981]. The situation was summed up
vividly in a letter to Pravda from a frustrated
agricultural engineer: 'My working day starts at six in
the morning. I check on the work of the mechanisers in
the tractor brigades and get the orders for spare parts.
Immediately I go off to the raisel'khoztekhnika
(district agricultural machinery centre), where I spend
the whole day 'winkling out' the necessary components
For what, I ask myself, did I spend five years in an
institute of higher education? To become an
"expediter"? Well you don't need higher education for
that' [Shirobokov 1980:2].
Perhaps the most insidious effect of all this is to drive
supply-hungry farms and farmers into the hands of the
pushers and speculators, as notoriously happened
with subsidiary industrial production in the early
1970s [Dyker 1981:141-2]. This in turn provokes
conservative political reaction which is readier to
punish irregularities than to do something fundamental
about supply problems. In a recent interview the
Minister for Agricultural Machine Building promised
an all-round improvement in supply, but made no
specific mention of the special supply problems of the
lower rungs of the agricultural ladder [Ekonomi-
cheskaya Gazeta 1982:2].
Conclusions
At the most general level the experience of
collectivised agriculture in the Soviet Union must
stand, above all, as a stark warning of the dangers of
an unbalanced growth strategy which gives priority to
collection rather than to collective work. (The phrase
was coined by Jerzy Karcz [1968:124].)
Perhaps things might have been different had the
period of 'paying tribute' been only five to ten years,
but one cannot but be struck by the depth and
permanence of much of the socio-psychological
damage that was done to the Soviet countryside in the
1930s. Fifty years on, the average kolkhoznik is still
ambivalent towards, even disaffected from, the
collective farm, though the figures cited on production
and investment trends suggest that there is now a
powerful 'pumping-over' impetus in favour of
agriculture. The demographic damage in terms of age
and sex distribution done to the village as succeeding
generations of young men were creamed off for the
industrialisation drive would have happened anyway,
particularly with the intervention of World War II,
but the sheer contempt for rural life which the
government priorities of the l930s and l940s induced
has made it much more difficult to recover from that
damage. To this day the great majority of rural school
leavers want nothing better than to get a town job
[Yermishin 1970:4; Chitalov et al 1980:3].
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More specifically, the experience of the Brezhnev
period has shown that much improved average levels
of remuneration, reflecting generous price policies, do
not by themselves lay a basis for a sustained upward
trend in agricultural output and productivity. High
levels of investment could surely have been a much
more effective lever had the allocation of that
investment been rather different. But investment
patterns have reflected a preference for grand projects
and transformatory strategies which in turn reflect a
complex of attitudes that seem to have changed only a
little since the Stalin and Khrushchev periods. When
the authorities are looking for a way out of immediate
difficulties they have shown themselves to be
eminently pragmatic about the private sector, and
about autonomous organisation within state and
collective farms. But when it comes to trying to shift
agriculture up a gear the strategy seems to be to
involve the peasants as little as possible. Contemporary
agricultural planners might be embarrassed by
Gor'kii's dictum that Soviet Russia's best hope was
that 'the half-savage, stupid and dull people of the
Russian villages and countryside will die out' [Gor'kii
1922:43]. But policies have only stuttered in the
direction of giving these dull people, if dull they are, an
opportunity to renew themselves through participation
in decision-taking, be it at ever so humble a level. A
package of measures which might form the basis for a
recommencement of growth and development in
Soviet agriculture would have to include:
- some kind of 'constitution' for the countryside
which would spell out the rights of kolkhozy and
sovkhozy to reorganise internally, and the rights of
the peasant in his/her private capacity, in more or
or less 'immutable' form;
- a shift in the allocation of agricultural investment
away from grand schemes towards balanced supply
of equipment to farms, brigades, links etc;
- a sharp improvement in the efficiency with which
land improvement schemes are implemented.
The second measure would be a wrench, but the third
might be very difficult outside the context of a
significant degree of general decentralisation in the
Soviet economic system. The first recommendation
comes up against the tradition of arbitrary command
which has fired the Bolshevik imagination and
permeated Soviet economic administration. There can
be no doubt that agricultural reform will be one of the
items highest on the agenda of the post-Brezhnev
government.
Postscript
The Food Programme for the period up to 1990 has just
been published [Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no 22, 1982].
Agricultural prices are tobe raised from January 1983,
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and 10 milliard rubles worth of outstanding kolkhoz
debts are to be written off, to free kolkhoz funds for
new investment. The private sector and the subsidiary
industrial sector are again mentioned as growth
points. Much stress is laid on the need for personal
initiative, and responsibility, and for an end to 'petty
tutelage'.
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